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RESTRUCTURING THE NIGERIAN
FINANCIAL SYSTEM FOR
ECONOMIC RESUSCITATION*
system as the black sPot and
presentation was focu^s of attack and concern, as
originally scheduled for 8th implied on our toPic for discu^sJuly I 993, tmder the title, "Bank sion One is not even stne that
Restmctning : Challenges and by the time the Presentation is
Wmities." Itwas resched- concluded, the conclusions
nled for z4thNovember 1993 might not have been overtaken
rnder a new tifle, "Restnrctur- by events, ild other develoPing the Nigerian Financial SYs- ments.
tem for Economic ResuscitaFor anumber of reasons, You
tion".
will find the treatnent of the
In today's re-presentation banking sector as dominating
which by divine providence the entire presentation. It is
could not be "wished awaY," I because it is the parent of the
was afraid that a new toPic entire financial system.
would be given to me at short
Before this presentation, I have
notice. What I appreciate most had access to the Central Bank
is the confidence reposed in of Nigeria's Economic RePort
me by yourExectrtive's persis- For The First Ilslf of 1993,
tence inrequesting me to speak and I have been priviledged to
on Restrrcturing the Nigerian read this addrcss titled, Recent
Financial System for Economic Development in the Nigerian
Resuscitation.
Financial Services Industry:
The' telocity of circulation", Problems and Challenges
with apologies to economist's presentedby tn{t P.A. Ogwuma,
language, in the art of gover- OFR, Govemor, Central Bank
nrnce in Nigeria, turpredict- of Nigeria at the annual Dirurer
able and epileptic as it is, not of the Ctrartered Institute of
mly necessitates the changing Bankers of Nigeria on l2ttr
of.dates for this presentation, November 1993.
brtr more firndamentally in havI have also read in the papers
rng far-reaching adverse eco- about a seminar onthe Crisis of
nomic consequence for our Confidence in the Financial
economy, with the financial Sector organised by Vacon

T*r's

BY

S.B. FALEGAN, FCIB

Ventures and Security Limited.

The I fttr Aruriversary Lecture
of First City Merchant Bank
Limited on the FaIl and Rise
of the Naira delivered by Professor Adebayo Adedeji was
particularly exciting.

AII of them deal with

with dilferent
emphasis and perception.
Whenl reflect onthem,I concluded on a sad note at the
same problems

waste of brain, intellect, lanowl-

edge, and perception by Nigerians in understanding and

identifring all their problems
and prescribing solutions, but
all wasted on lack of sincere
and honest implementation by

the nrling class, resulting in
our culhre of development by

*A Paper delivered to the Nigerian Finance Association at the Auditorium of the Chartered Institute of Bankers
Victoria Island, Lagos, on Friday lTth December, 1993.
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the

destmction.
I start with Table I deliberately, which deals with the Federal Government Finances.
From it, it is as if it was deliber-

policy compliments, as is evident in govemment expenditures, run foul of other policy

options and objectives, resulting in action worse ttran inactivate that the introduction of
ity.
the Structural Adjustment Underlying the existing level
Programme in l986was planned of Federal Govemment deficit
and destined to fail from is in- is the unknown amorrnt of defiception Other than the brief cit of all the state and local
period of 1987, the Federal govenrments which to me are
Govemment deficit grew annu- basic to futtne policy decisions.
ally at an ulprecedented rate From both public pronounceending in a deficit of N62 bil- ments and newspaper reports,
lion (actual) in 1992 and N27 nearly all the state govemments
billion in the first half of 1993, and local govemments are in
higher than estimated for the arrears of payment and in debt
whole yea$. It overshot the of one nature or the other to
plarured expendinre of N83.3 contractors, suppliers, statebillion by Nt I billion in the owned banks and the budding
nine montrhs of 1993, while es- community banl6. None seems
timated revenue ofNl08 billion to have been able to p ay the 45o/o
was do'rn to N99.7 billion by salary increase to all workers
the estirnates for the whole year. forced on them by the Babangida
Apart from the recurring budget Administration without regard
deficits, exta bud getary expen- for ability to pay.
The heaps of refuse in our
ditures, that is, rurplanned for
budgetary spending predomi- streets, the unpaid salaries of
nated with reckless abandon teachers for months at both lowithout visible sign that they cal and state govemment levels
are spent onthe productive sec- are evidence of additional fitors ofthe economy. From avail- nancial burden that will militate
able information, about 40,000 against any balaneed or reduced
projects of doubtful value that budgetary deficit in the near
would still require N300 billion future. Nor must we fail to
mention such outstanding comto complete are abandoned.
The consequence ofThble l, mitrnents to workers in almost
in short, is that the inter-rela- all the parastatals, including the
tionship among macroeconomic Police and the Army.
variables as tools for policy
It is painful that one can not
flumagement is put to severe quantify these commitnents in
and unsustainable test of inef- Naira and kobo. When all of
fectiveness where one of the them are however taken into

))

account, the unavoidable financial commitrnents will firrther reinforce inctrrring additional budgetary de fi c its, which
will render any fiscal policy
meaningless in the next couple
of years and therefore continue to undermine monetary
and other policies.
[n a circumstance of fiscal
indisc ipline and profl igacy, the
efficacy of monetary, balance
ofpayments, e xchange rate and
interest rate policies become
meaningless. The consequence is self-reinforcing and
lethal. There is a cumulative
excessive monetary and credit
expansion, which generates
high powered money that re-

sults in cumulative inflation
which impair and intensify
pressures on interest rates
which exerts severe pressure
on an ever-depreciating Naira,

artificially held down by fiat.
The cumulative money illusion, buoyed by the cumulative inflation generates cumulative depression and fall in
output, Ieading to cumulative
unemployment, both voltrrtary
and involuntary.

The cumulative fall in demand leads to the substinrtion
and rising and thriving informal market at the expense of
the formal market where taxavoiding and evading r-urderground markets now substitute for a falling tradable industry.
The rising external debt bur-

bil- cluded shell of financial manlion, andthe deteriorating bal- agement, I now watch with deance of palments deficit, fi.u- spair and anxiety, the mixedther compounds the exchange grill pollution that is attendant
den now estimated at $35

rate depreciation which firrther

on the whole financial system.

escalate capital flight. In succession, the stock rrarket dips,

the

resulting in sustained downward trend in share price trad-

The deregulation of

onomy, however unavoidable,
is now beit g threatened, albeit
unnoticed, by a crisis of the
e:c

ing activities. Capital flight financial systerr
At the time of writing,
abroad is reinforced by lack of
domestic investrrent where the

there

are about 125 banks - corlmer-

whole system is awash with cial and merchant banks. Beexcess liquidity, where firnd fore the I 986 deregulation, there
holders prefer to invest in shortdated liquid assets at high

were about 40 commercial banks

and 15 merchant banks. That
in terest rates, than tie their period can be regarded as the
period of crawling or elephanmoney down to long-term
invesfuients becau^se they are tine banking - drab,
oligopolis tic, lethargic and connot sure of any retum.
rWith the financial system ceited. The banking system, inawash with cash in the absence deed the whole financial system
of investrnent outlet, there is was highly regulated. Banks
the consequence of cumula- were subjected to s evere res tictively depressed and repressed tions both on their products and
financial system, the most felt their activities, thus limiting the
iryact and victim being the banking system's activities and
abilities to adapt to changing
banking sector.

lenges they face from the new
ones. They still have a proPer
grip on their network branches
of depositors who are still being paid interest on their deposits atheavy discount or below the market rate. It is interesting to watch deposit rates in
some ofthes e older banks hover
aroturd 12 to l8 percent while

new breed commercial barks
pay as high as 27 to 30 percent
for similar deposit. Some of
them still employ the old ar-

chaic method of banking

through queuing, manual operation and referenc ing for cus tomer attendance. No wonder
the queue and complains are;

still endless, in an ever-challenging and expanding business environment.
The deregulation era brought
in its wake new breed banking
promoted by private initiatives
and capital. These new breed

banls are nm by highflyers
and risk-takers who have chal-

market conditions. The charac- lenged the older ones to ttreirl
teristic excessive regtrlatory con- lethargy. For both commercial;
The Banki-ng Sector
trols and restrictive banking leg- and merchant banks, they must
In this era when the word islations of the period led to tlre nurnber almost 60 or more,
"Bank" is beingused inamost repression of the banking sys- ernploying the most modern
irreverent way, it is tempting to ten The commercial banla had and s ophis ticated instruments,
interchange financial system a network of branches for including computer applicawith the banking system. You mobilising nnal savings for a tion, electronic banking and
will fmgive me if I fall into pitance andtaking zuch savings micrographics. No wonder the
nrchnap. I have had the oppor- to the u:rtan cenhes for lending, older ones comp lain about ttrem
tunity of being a Central thus draining the rual areas of or unfair practices and compeBanlcer, a mortgage banker, a their funds for lack of invest- tition in snatchiag their cus-l
stockbroker and an operational ment outlets. M*y of these tomers.
banker in both commercial and older banks are only being
The thirdsetofbanking is the
merchant banking. In my se- forced to change by the chal- Hoi Poloi: including those set
23

[r"
W by the Federal Govemment
The Nigerian People's Bank
which have 830 branches nationwide; those encouraged by
the govemment - the commu-

rities and Exchange Commission, along with the Nigerian

nity banks now numbering 5 12.
Th"y are expected to rise to
1,000 at the end ofthe year. The
god thing about community
banl6 is that they not only compete effectively with the oldtime banks in mobilising ruzl
savings and they pay competitive rates and attract customers
and depositors away from them.
There are those who take joy
in borrowed names - the mortga3e bankers, largely savings
and loans and building societies. Theynumberabout 145 now.
Finalli is the mixed grill called

panies, including issuing

Finance companies most of
which combine commercial,
merchant and mortgage banking functions: ostensibly they
don't take deposit but in reality
"borroul" money to take "deposit" such that make their borrowed fimds are larger than the
deposits ofsome ofthe licensed

deposit-taking banks. Th"y
nurrber about 660. Of course,
we must not forget nor underestimate ttte "wonder banks"
whose urauthodoxy makes nonsense

of professional and con-

ventional banking.

The rapid and diversified
growth inthe money mar{<et of
our financial system has also
been accompanied by the
growth in the sectrrities (capital) market with both the Secu24

Stock Exchange as the regulatory authorities. There are no\y
about 140 stock broking com-

houses, fund and investnent
nranagers and registzrs. In addition to the above are about
136 insurance and reinsr:rance
companies operating as part of
the financial systern
Equrlly important for mentioning are the development
banl6, including the recently
established Urban Development
Bank along with the Federal
Mortgage Bank and is satellite
mortgage houses.
The rapid growth and stmctural changes which have
characterised the system have
also been accompanied by some
operational developments aimed
at making the system work effectively and efficiently. Th"y
include:
development of about 132
bureaux de change as
zupplement to oflicial foreign exchange operations,
(ii) the short-livedtransformation of the Foreign Exchange Market from an
auction to an inter-bank
rnarket, where the whole
banking system including
the Central B ankwere market makers in response to
market forces,
(iii) the establishment of secu-

(i)

government securities
among themselves fon an
active secondary market,
(iu) the establishment ofthe
institutional stmcture for
the operation of an interbank settlement system
arising from over-night
and other inter-bank firnd
placements, (The clearing house lorown as Nigerian Inter'bank Settlement
System which replaces the
existing clearing system
at the Central Bank started
operations in May, 1993),

(")

the establishment of

three discount houses to
begin dis cotmt operations

to facllitate

monetary
policy via open market
operations.

The banking system in
response to business circumstances and challenges has also

been responsible for promoting Unit Thrsts as additional
furancial intermediaries and

deposit-taking outlets. Also,
either in response to avoiding

ttle "common directive" requesting them to provide "sub
sidy funds" to the National

Housing Fund or in facing the
challenges posed by furance
houses or both, many commercial banl6 and merchant
banks are directly, albeit
subtly, involved in setting up
some mortgage instinrtions and
rities transfer facility for finance houses.
banls wishing to trade

I

larity of the products apart, their
enhancement is firrther hampered by the o.21'.perfect lorowlpetitive environment, the banks edge of the market where the
have embarked on aggressive investors have tumed the dedifferentiate d products promo - posit-hunt competition into a
tion into the Nigerian money seller's market.
In response to the need for
market as a way of increased
share of a captive market and improved services to customproviding improved quality s er- ers, somebanks have intoduced
vices to customers to boost the Electronic Banking System
their deposit base. As con- (EB S ), whereby customers have
firmed in the Nigeria Deposit access to their bank account
Insurance Corporation's from any of its branches. Addi(NDIC) 1991 Annual Report, tional facility provided by EBS
commerc ial and merctrant bank include on-line s ignature verifiproducts stood at 37 and 35 cation, immediate ftrnd transfer
respectively atthe end of 199 l, between branches and consoliall directed at individual, busi- dation of accounts, all of which
ness and corporate customers facilitate the clearing system.

Product Initiation, Imitation
and Dilferentietion
In order to sunrive the com-

(seeNDIC Auural Report I 99 I
page 45). Their tenor varies
from 90 days to 180 days for
coillmercial banks and up to
365 days for merchant banks.
Virtually each bank has its
brand product or brand niune,
while the minimum investrnent
in a product is now N25,000
with upfront interest payment ;
some of the products are converted or rc-discounted before

manrity.
Apart from the similarity in
all the products as to tenor,
accessibility, yield (except in
brand name), they are operationally not different from one
another. The r:ncertainty and
volatility in interest rates even
hamper the ir entrancement and
effectiveness as instruments of
deposit mobilisation. The simi25

Problems and Challenges
Subsumed in these developments are the fears that sooner
or later the cut-ttnoat competition and the get-rich-mania are
bound to adversely affect the
banking system as already evidenced in the collapse of some
finance houses, the hidden illiquidity and irsolvency of some
banks and the commonplace
default inmoney mar{<et operations. Of course, the regulatory
environment has never been
lacking and it will be examined
later. The problem with such
regulations is the breath-taking
rate at which the operators bit
the regulators, making the
latter merely reactive and not
problem anticipating. The con-

sequence of all these is that we
are passing through a period in
this corurfry in which the banking community, indeed the

whole financial system is increasingly being regarded with
hostility, unpopularity and resentrhent. Some of the banks
are established with small
down payment and borrowed
funds. Through inter-locking
ownership and directorate of
other institutions, they estab
lish finance houses and mortgage institutions and direct
credit to related companies, so
that the owners would have the
necessary funds to repay their
debts.
What are the problems? Page
17 of the Africen Guardien
1993
February
summarised the problems fac-

of

l5ttr

ing the banking industry in
Nigeria with this heading "Fraud, inept management and
many other factors are pushing
banl$ down the abyss."

The Nigeria Deposit hsurance Corporation established
in I 988joined tre Central Bank
of Nigeria as part of the regulatory framework of the banking system. The NDIC, as we
allknow, has the responsibility
for ens uring depositors's fiurds
and guaranteeing refirnds so as
to prevent insolvency, under-

capitalisation, substandard,
doubtful loans and negative
shareholders fimds. In June
1991, two Decrees - numbers
24 and 25 (Central Bank of

Nigeria Decree I 99 I andBanks
and other Financial Institutions
Decree 1991) wene issued to
firther stnengthen the regulatory authority overthe banking
and the financial system. With
strch arsenal, the Central Bank
of Nigeria iszued, through its
Banking Supewision Department, its November 7, 990 circular letter to all licensed Banks

ping rry excess liquidity, frre situ-

ation deteriorated with more

(vi) relationship between

Barrlrs." The guidelines relate
to requirements for asset class ification and disclosutres, provisiore, interest accnrals and off-

changes in GNP per capita
banks on the r.urhealthy list.
income and some monTo reinforce the evidence of
etary aggregates, and
threatening imminent banking (vii) growth in the secuities
failrne and collapse, the NDIC
market, showing new isin its 1991 Annual Report
sues ratio and share tumshowed sustained deterioration.
over ration.
It was reported in the 1991 Annual Report of NDIC for exDue to lackof adequate data,
ample that of the 119 banks I am restricting myself to exexisting at the time, eight were amining ilre growttr and the
distressed, that is, technically relationship between demand
insolvent. Ofthe eight, one was deposit and money supply
a privately orvned commercial which
have termed the
bank, while the rest were state monetisation ratio. The other
govemment owned commercial relationship is the growttr in

balance sheet engagements.

banlc.

setting out the"Prudential

Guidelines for Licensed

I

total commercial and merchant
assets and the grourth in GNP
per capita income.

In applying these regulatory
instuments, the Central Bank
was reponted to have classified
in September 1992, the 124
banf6 operating in Nigeria into
two categories - heelthy and
rurheelthy - nsrng the following
as criteria - ability to meet specified cash neserve, liquidity ratio, statutory paid-up capital
adequacy ratio, sornd numage-

Monetisation and
Financialisation of the
Financial System

To refl ect the financialisation

ratio, the examination of the
other monetary and financial

The extent to wtrich an economy
is being monetized and the ex-

tent of its financial deepening
are often based on a ntrrnber

aggregates (s ecurities, bonds,
shares, finance and mortgage
assets etc.) in relation to other

of indicators especially GNP

factors with the banking would have provided the ex-

system's role as the barometer tent of fi nanc ial broadening and
ment and adherence to pruden- for measuring such factors:
deepening. We are, however,
(i)
gro\Mth
money
stock,
banks
used
in
guidelines.
The
tial
constrained by lack of adpartici(ii)
rise in the ratio of demand equate and reliable informatk criteria to determine
deposit to money supply tion, and restricted to a narrow
pation in the inter-bank foreign
(lvfl),
exchange market. Eventually, 44
definition of financialisation
(iii) growth in Quasi Money, ratio, which is the ratio of total
banks were adj udged rurtrealthy,
that is, in savings (M2),
14 ofwhich are state-owned, I 8
cornmercial and merchant
(iv)rise
in the ratio of demand banks'assets to GNP.
are merctnntbanls andtwo are
deposit to money supply
cmmerc ial banks partly owned
shows the
Table
(M2),
by the Federal Governrnent.
monetisation process. In the
With the advent of the Dutch (v) rise in financial assets, in- 1960s, the ratio of demanddestitutional markets and posit (DD)to Ml and M2 averAuction method at the forex
products including bonds, age 38 percent nd,26 percent
and the extensive use of
stocks and sharcs, etc.,
stabilisation securities for moprespectively. With some wide

II
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fluctuations DD to Ml ratio
peaked at 6 in 1980 and declinedto 50 in I 983. In I 9E4, it
again picked rry, reached 63 in
1985, then rp to 1989 the declirrcwas sr.rstained. The situation fluctuated between 1990
and 1992. The same observation is tnre of the relationship
between demand deposit and
M2. The currency ratio (MlDD), that is, the money multiplier or income velocity of
money is ordinarily expected
todecline toshowthe degree to
which the economy is being
monetized. What we ar€ saying there is that the way money
affects prices and output depends on how fast it circulates
through the economy which is

money's income velocity of
circulation, that is, the anmral
nominal GNP divided by
money stock. The increased
use of demand deposit in the
1980s is thus vividly reflected
inthe inverse income velocity
of mmey. The decline in the
1990s is anotherway ofsaying

from 9.8 percent in 1960, lO.2 geu/ at a drastically reduced
percent in 1970 to 20 percent in rate. Two other measures, the
1980 and 25 percent in 1983. Bank AssetVGNP ratio (Table
The broad money M2 shows the IV) and MI/GNP or M2IGNP
monetisation ratio M2 to GNP ratios show sharp contrast, with
of 12.4o/o in 1960, 15.9o/o ra phenomenal growth rate in
1970 and3Z.Zo/oin 1980, ti.ing nominal terms. When meato 43.3o/o in 1983. Table trI strred inrealterms, as shownin
shows the tnend of those rela- Thble III, the ratio fell sharply
tionships upto I 992. Since then, and growth rate fluctuated
there has been increas e or broad- donrnwards drastically. In efening of furancial institutions fect, monetary signals have
for business and economy ex- gone wild and wrong. Money's
pansion. Apart from that, ttrere income velocity of circulation
has been sustained growth in both innominal andreal terms
financial assets, institutions, fell significantly in all the eco'
intermediaries and market, all nomic sectors.
Based on a declining per
of which should strengthen the
monetisation base, that is, M2 capita income particularly in
to GNP and the financialisation the last five years, ttrese develbase, that is, growth in money opments b"tray the extent to
and capital markets in forms of which inflation has bloated the

bonds, stocks, shares, etc.
As shown earlier, not only have
the banks multiplied, other Iinancial intermediaries have als o
doubled or non-existing ones
developed.
Ideally, the aggregation ofthe
ratio of commercial and merthat ttre money supply has been ctrant bank assets to GNP plus
utilised or made to operate and the ratio of total securities to
functionmore effrciently in the GNP will provide an accurate
1980s than in the 1990s.
measure of the economy's
The firrther intensifi cation of financialisation ratio. All that is
the monetisation provided is regretably available is shownin
better appreciated against a Table IV.
background of the changes in
As shown in Thbles II to M
GNP per capita income and the financial system in nominal
Ml and M2 respectively. The terms has grown rapidly. Howmonetisation ratio Ml to GNP, ever, trsing the GNP deflator,
that is, the inverse of the in- money stock measured by both
come velocity of money grew Ml and M2 fell sharply and
27

actual growtn and performance

of our banking and financial
system.
The period January 1993 to
June 1993 would have presented an accurzte picture
ttre point b"irrg made here that
there has been intensification
of cash in preference to the use
of bank deposit and the use
cheques. That is, there is the
preference for use of cash than
for use of banks; that within a
few days that a cheque is paid
in, tre bnlk of it is withdrawn in
cash. I rmderstand that the situation was aggravated duning
the political campaigns when
"cash and calr5/" operations replaced banking operations, that
is, the intensifiedu,se ofmoney

multiplier through increase in each class of bank of N50 mil- wtrich are depos itories for these
velocity of circulation of cur- lion for commercial banks and fl oating funds srrile home with
rencies at the expense of bank N40 million formerchant banks usury rates they charge the
deposits, that is, a has become negative and gross ly banks and otherborrowers. The
demonetis ation o f the economy. inadequate. lrt me emphasize fierce and almost unconholThe banking system must admit the consequence for all finance lable cut-throat competition
responsibility for the loss of houses, mortgage instinrtions within the banking industy
confidence and faith by custom- and non-bank financial institu- does not help rnatters. If it is
ers preferring "cash and carry" tions of our financial systern
not under-cutting in deposit
operations to banking operaLike the banks they are equally hunts, it is out-bidding in the
characterised by capital inad- foreign exchange market. The
tions.
First, there is the impression equacy, illiquidity and in most increasing level of default in
thatttre benefitinthe upsr:rge in cases insolvency, managed and the inter-bank money market
the number of banks to the operated by non-professional firttrer dents the image of the
economy has been minimal, and inexperienced raiders of the system.
When these firnds find their
merely servicing and not pro- financial system. Infact, I will
ductive of the economy. Sec- not be surprised if some or many way to the foreign exchange
ond, some banks only thrive in of the community banks are not market, chasing ttre limited
esoteric and over-the-counter already smartering under the fore ign exchange available, the
senrices without contribution to same problems. Just like the Centzl Bank is blamed for
real output and production. Federal Govemment and State underfirnding FOREX. The
They, instead, contribute to fi- govemments rely on excessive cumulative effect is the
nancial repression so evident in borrowing from banks owned unending depreciation of the
govemment- le d fls c al profl ig acy by them (however small their Naira, the end of which is not
that has characterised the Nige- share ownership), community in sight.
From another angle, the
rian economy. There is no evi- banls must have become vicdence of increased output of tims of local govemments where banking system has become a
goods and services collmensu- some local govemment chair- victim of its operations. Burate with the growttr and quan- men make themse lves chairmen reaux de Change that are set rry
as buffer between bid time ustity of money supply. Hence, of such community banl6.
Apart from Govemment prof- ers of foreign exchange and
run-away inflation typical of
the German pos t-war economy ; ligacy and some non-oil export small users have become a
and t depressed economy proceeds that exporters prefer major instrument of foreign
characterised by profound un- to change in the black market exchange manipulations, dicderemployment, reminis cent of and the like, the bulk of the tating in conjuction with the
the typical stagflation. Third, money is from proceeds of laun- parallel market, the rate of exgiventhe rate of inflation in the dered cocaine money and po' ctrange. It is amazing that no
economy and the daily depre- litical firnds. Yet, the little that is sooner did the Central Bank
ciation of the Naira, it is obvi- left is squeezed from the bank- clamp down on transactiors
ous that the banking system is ing system in form of with bills for collection and
now characterised by capital stabilisation securities. Mean- open accounts than the Buinadequacy and in real terms, while, the banks' competitors - reaux de Change become not
the minimum paid-up capital of finance and mortgage houses only fertile market for forex
28

but a patronising market for nr:rnber of banks. lacked profes hr any part of the worl4 the
some of the less-than-candid sional experience and economic financial system, the hub of
banl$ that care less of the ef- or moral solvency.
which indeed is the banking
The issue of uncertainty and sector, is often regarded as the
fects of theirprofessional misconduct in further deprec iating

the naira. Meanwhile, the finance companies and mortgage

in^stability in tenure of office of engine and catalystfor groMtr
key management staff espec ially and deve lopment by providing
in government-owned banks finance and building up the
continues to give concern about industrial and agricqltuml sec-

houses ,engage actively in
"banking" without "depos its", government interference.
to outwit ttre licensed banl6 Privatisation of these banks notand in collusion with parallel withstanding, the recent restrrcmarket and Bureaux de Change turing of the board of directors
in the absence of prudential of the banks where the Federal
guidelines for them. It is confu- Government is now a minority
sionrelnforcing confusion in a shareholder has caused some
viciqus circle!
ripples and misgivings to the
Fourth, the quality of rnn- extent ttrat it was reported that
agement and staffing of banks stockbrokers have shurured
have beencalled into question. shares of banks onthe Nigerian
The NDIC obs ervedttrat "some Stock Exchange. Meanwhile, it
banks are characterised by in- is no exaggeration thatthe bankept managoment and instabil- ing, furance houses and morlity inthetenure of oflice ofkey gage institutions sector of the
management staff. Negative Nigerian economy is regarded
culture of interpersonal as an avaricious blood-sucker
wranglings among some bank's ttrat has the best conditiors of
top managernent hamper op- services in the country and
erations as this often leads to within the service sector of the
polarisation of rank and file of N igerian economy in particular.
staff. Board members and top Yet, like Oliver Twist that have
management staff in some become part of the ever-debanks embarked on empire manding and strike-inducing
building quarrels on access to aspect of our national life that
priviledges and perquisites of negate increased output and

I

office rather than charting productivity.
profitable plans for trreir banks."
Meanwhile, poor attendance to
customers, lo4B queues at
counters, bureaucratic delays,
indifferent and c lumsy s ervices
drive customers to non-bank
finance houses. It is clear from
the above that a considerable
29

The bankers did not help matters when they dragged themselves before the Securities and
Exchange Commis sion and two
of them had to be suspended
from the capital market for what
one can call for want of one
word, financial rascality.

tors, which in tum rnake service sector prosperous. The
time was when in the 1960s
before the civil war interegnum
and up to 1974, this country
witressed economic growth
and development. Between
the mid-7Os to mid-80s, there
was growth without development. Painfully, since then up
to date, Nigeria has had neither growth nor development
in the midst of vast andlimitless material and human resour ces, except money illusion,
with the consequential financial repression. Real growttr is
negative. Lack of growttr and
development are evident u the

structure of financing, all of
which are at the short-termend
of the market as reflected in
our banking sector. Inter-bank
lending and foreign exchange
trading have become dominant
in the market. The prohibitive
lending rates discourage investment in agriculture and industry. The banking systemenhib
its a lifestyle of extreme opulence that exposes the sector to
envy and ridicule. Yet, strikes
for better conditions of se.nrice
are called by that sector as a
routine cultr-ue of banking ina

squalid country, deoaying with
lack ofjob opportunity, lack of
money to provide jobs, lack of
adequate transportation, lack of
housing infrastruchne and dying industry reinforcedby a cultrne of development by destmction. All these sum rry a sad
though unfair image such that
rather than our banking system
responding to solve these problernsl, they operate as mere servicing and consuming outfits,
set outnotmerely to discourage
the real sector growth but to
liquidate them; forgetting that
when the real sector assets on
which money supply depends
fails to firnction, the banks themselves sooner or later face the
threat of collapse.
Put in anotherway, do we feel
comfortab le about the long -term
implication for the economy
when itis safer, more profitable,
riskless and rewarding to earn
not less than N20,000 a month
by, merely depositing Nl million with a bank as against an
investor in the same bank with
same NI million whose arurual
retum on capital is not more
ttnn N25,000. We can all imagine the disinsentive to a manufactr.ner or an industrialist or a
farmer whose gestation period
for investing and producing lies
betweennot less than I 8 months
and twenty-four months before
he canbe sure of sales, in addition to strrctural bariers such
as lack ofwatersupply, electricity instabillty i" monetary and
30

fiscal changes. In the area of ing is intensified among themunder-provision for bad and selves through inter-bank dedoubtful debts which affect the fault, while the Centzl Bank
inadequate capital base of some

banks classified as problem
banl6, I wonder whether these
banls ever considerthe seriotr,s
implic ation for the ir s e lf-de feating operations.
This is done by merely turning
their valued gustomers into debr
ors and malting marginal debtors chronic and big-time debr
ors of irredeemab le proportions .
A bank lends Nl million to a
ctrstomer at 25o/o interest rate
per arulumt suddenly hikes the
rate 30, 40, 45o/o per anmrm
within a pflce of six months; it
becomes a probldnl loan forthe
customer, a non-performing loan
for the bank for which provisions have to be made.
The provision for such problem loan including accrued interest rises comespondingly for
the bank which hrms the bank
into a problem bank severely

is chasing them all.
Whether we like it or not, it
is the banking system that
will be blamed forall ofthese,
even where the banking sector
is a victim of circumstances.
That reminds me of a treatise
I readmany years ago, the title
of which is "Why Banks are
Unpopular." It was reported
by the author, Mr. Guide Carli
ttrat one Mr. Schopenhauser
on visiting the gallery where
the pornaits of the Fugger
(a German word for a banker)
were hung and observing their
images, exclaimed: "when I
look at your faces, I have to

t

admit that God is not with
you."

That is the challenge our

banking system, indeed, the
whole financial system faces
today. It is perhaps in these
challenges ttrat solutions can
leading to further under- be volunteered for resuciating
capitalisation, credit risk, de- the financial system.
clining profitability and damage to balance sheet from over- The Regulatory Arsenal
exposure. By charging customers such prohibitive usury rates, Of course, it is clear to all
the banks are unconsciously in- ofus that there is nowant or
flicting financial distress on lack of regulation of our
thems elves since their provis ion financial system. What seems
is the fi-rnction ofthe size oftheir to be wrong or worrisome
non-performing loans. The from time to time is that the
amusing thing now is to find the
banks in the same stupor and
sraight-jacket that they find the ir
defaulting customers. The chas-

?

regulatory environment is very
hostile and unproductive of the
system. There is the culture of
how to break and not how to

I

confonn with the rules. Mentionhas beenmade of the Decrees No. 24 and 25 (Central
Bahk of Nigeria Decree l99l
and Bank and other Financial
Instinrtions Decree l99l respectively) which repealed and
replaced the Banking Act of
I 969 ptus its four other amendments with the sole purpose of

effective control, regulation
and zupervis ion of the system.

The creation of the Nigerian
Deposit Insurance Corporation
nnderDecree No. 22 of 198 8 is
to fufiherinsulate the banking
system fr om furancial cris es o

f

illiquidity and

insolvency.

These are well stated in Section 5 (a-e) of the Decree.
Before detailed discus sion of
restruchrring and opportunities, Section l5(a) of the De-

cree establishing NDIC has
become worrisome to me andl
ern sune it must be a source of
concem for the authorities at
NDIC. The section stated that
all licensed banks end such
other financial institutions in
Nigeria engaged in the business ofreceivin g deposit shall
be required to insure their
deposit liabilities with the
Corporation.
With the fast-changing kaleidoscope of terminologies in
Nigeria, the word Bank is no

I

(Fln[B). The FMB itself is a
deposit taker. I am not sure
wtretheris deposits are expected
to be insured wittr NDIC, not to
talk of the deposits of ttre secondarymor{gage banl6. The finance houses are or qualifu as
other flnancial institutions in
Nigeria. Although, they deny
b"iog deposit takers, everyone
lorows that the euphemism for
their deposits is "loan firnds"
which amounted to Nl.3billion
for the 84 out of 618 finance

I
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a pointer as to why no new

bank has spnrng up rurder that
rulme. Where, from practical
experience, the NDIC has the
fural authority in providing solutions, factors of social, political, sectional and psychological dimensions must have
constrained it.
The question I often ask myself on reading some of these
reports is: what next? Is it sufcompanies operating at the end ficient to merely cry and idenof 1992. Deposit orno deposit, tity these problems every year
such large size of "loan firnds" and in occasional reports withthat end up fueling inflation and out taking concrete steps and
disputing both money market f,um decisions on implementaand foreign exchange market tion? This is the cnur of the
has serious implications for matter, and why is it so? There
monetary policy and control. are many vested and conflictThe relevant question here is: ing intenests from the negative
should their deposits (funds) be to the indifferent, from the
insrred? And by whom?
mundane to the sublime, from
want to make bold to say the self-seeking to the selfttnt NDIC within its short-life centred, political and non-pospan has proved to be a very litical, all operating behindthe
eff,rcient voice forrescuing fail- scene andstalling all solutions
ing banks. Practical experience ttrat give the impression that
musthave shown, however, that those in charge are shirking

I

some

of its laws need to be

revised or changed. Sections 22,
23,and24 of itsDecree seemto
lay more emphasis on penalities
andnot on solutiors whilethere
are some ambivalence in the
practical application of Section
more limited to licensed banks. ZL.Itseerns to be diffrcult for a
Most, ifnot all mortgage insti- bank that has been closed down
tutions inNigeriause tlre word for insolvency to easily develop
bank and they are all licensed public confidence to such art
by the Federal Mortgage Bank extent as to reapply to function

i

again. The case ofthe Farmers
Bank of the early 50s must be

their responsibilities, which is
not necessarily so.
Those were the questions agitating my mindwhen the Central B ank ofN igeria announced
the boldest, most courageous
measures of taking overmajor
sthte-owned banks - New Nigeria Bank Plc, Mercantile
Bank of Nigeria Plc., African
Continental B ank Plc., PanAfricanBank Limited and Coop-

erative and Commerce Bank Plc.

According to the Deputy Govemor of the Central Bank of
Nigeria, the meastnes were necessitated "by ttre alarming deterioration in the financial pos ition of the banls which has not
abated inspite of series of corrective measures taken by the
regulatory authorities to res olve
their problems." Besides, owners of the banks had defied the
persistent calls on them by the

age tothe banking system.

(ii)

operandiofthe
technical sr.pervision of
banls are now clear such
that control and rumagement are substantially tightened. Its mandate to take
over the a&ninistration and
where desirable, the ownT}ne modus

Non-Licensed Banks'
Deposit?
There is the school of thought
that holds that NDIC should
go beyond its existing operations and cover deposits ofthe
People's Bank, the Commu-

nity Banks, the Mortgage
riencing solvency prob- Banks and even the Finance
ership of such banks expe-

CBN and the NDIC

to (iii)
"recapitalise their banks large ly
because ttre capital deficiencies

ofthe banks are farbeyond what
the owners can afford ... the
action was in the interest of the ir
depositors and other creditors

and the compelling need to
maintain stability in the banking system."

lems are now uninhibited,
and it must remain so.
The NDIC can now exercise its mandate to sell a
problem bank, if the shareholders fail within a period
to recapitalise or sell off its
contolling interest. This it
can do by making efforts to
furd potential buyers such
that ottrer ttran losses suffered by shareholders, loss

of depositors and other

(A) Fbrther Strengthening
the Arsenal of

(B) Should NDIC Insure

(iv)

Regulations

Houses. This is at atime when
there is crisis of confidence in
the new outfits and evidence of
the incipient stages of a pending financial crisis. Such a sug-

gestion gives the impression
ttrat the NDIC itself can not
run out of firnds. The NDIC
operations are limited to banks
that have more capital base, a
muchmore earning solid base
and cons iderable management

and it is already overwhelmed
creditors can b e minimised. by problems from that sector.
To firtd interested buyers, To super-impose on it an addiNDIC must be able to give tional burden of insuring de-

different funds with

By this singular action, what
looked like a dormant or passive
role ofthe regulatory andsupervisory authorities is now made
to bear on the system:

(i)
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What appears

too much
emphas is on the automatic
role ofNDIC, of its depos it
insr:rance firnctionhas been
zupplemented by other
firnctions and active ir$truments made to intervene,
sell orrefl oat a solvent bank
in order to minimise damas

(v)

posit of uncertain bubonic institutions is to court disaster
for the system. At a time when
all "deposittakers" depend on
brokered deposits - an expensive and uncertain source of
frmds, gathered together by
middlemen and shunted offto
wtroeverpays the highest yield,
and at a time when the irrvestor-fund holder is dictating
ately or otherwis e confirs ed terms and creating a seller's
Bank Deposit Insurance market, the velocity of casualScheme with Fidelity ties of failed houses that will
Guarantee fnsurance.
lorock at the door oftheNDIC
will crash the financial system

favourzble guarantees to
potential hryers at minimum cost.
Theneedtofirrttrerstreamline the role of the NDIC
on Deposit Insurance was
apparent inthe dispute that
has arisen between NICON
and two ormore mortgage
banks that have deliber-

i

took over the five banks, there
were indications that trvo addiThe solutionto the above is as tional banks were in distress
and about twenty-five other
follows:
(a) Let the mortgage institu- banls were illiquid, though not
tions and the finance yet ins olvent. This development
houses respectively de- raises other questions as to the
velop independent De- source of funds with which the
posit Insurance Schemes CBN and NDIC rescue these
distressed banls. It also raises
for their operations.
the issue whether both CBN
(b) Raise deposit insurance and NDIC have limitless repremium as a way of sources with which they can
maintaining investor c on- bail out every banh and all banks
fi dence, especially in this in distress. If the resources are
period of hyper inflation. from the ir operational surp luses,
well and god. If, however, they
(c) Also, raise the limit/in- have to resort to borrowing,
sured to N500,000.00. printing notes just for the sake
Both deposits and banks of salvaging banks, the implicacan share the cost of tion for monetary management
higher premium involved and policy as it is inflation-inthrough higher fees for duced should be clear and unservices or reduction in ambiguous. That is why the two
interest rates on deposits. irntitutiors must not hesitate to
sell offthe banks to willing buyers and ctxtomers as soon as
Finally, while the NDIC
possible. That is *hy, as an alunder Section 34 of its Decree has authority to enforce temative, they must be ready to
mergers and consolidations, liquidate such banks where the
it will be to ttre credit of the situation warrants it. In addition
banking system's health to the above and for an effective
growth and credibility to open market operations being
evolve mergers and acquisi- irurovated in the system, the
tions without prompting from CBN has to be selective in the
regulatory bodies, where such number of viable and healthy
actions will instill confidence banks that can participate in
of both the investing and the scheme in order to make
it fturction efliciently.
patronising public.

totally.

Since the finance houses have

(C) Limit to Limitless
Funding by CBN
At the time the Cental Bank
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been turder the regulatory umbrella ofthe CBN effective I 99 l,
the Crntral Bank must revise

and pnescribe their minimum
capital requirement, provide
prudential guidelines and instinrte a sr.perv ision technique
over them to streamline many
of their conflicting roles.
A Reviewof Firebrigade Sector Mode of Administration

As you can see from my treatment of the subject so far, it
appears problems are being
treated ad hoc and as they oc-

cur in each sector, without
proper coordination, and the
attendant implication of their
inter-relationships. One or two
examples will suffice:
(i) There is the call by the
Finance Houses Ass ociation of Nigeria that the

Central Bank of Nigeria
should re gulate the activities ofFinance Houses and

other financial institutions. While I share the
view of the need forregulation of these finance
houses to take account of
their recapitalisation and
management stmcture, I
am often puzzled about
the number of responsibilities the Central Bank
of Nigeria is expected to
shoulder, given its own
limited human and management resources. The
othertime, I read in one of
the papers that ttre Banking Supervision Department of the Cennal Bank

crried 61n less than twenty
five pencent of its inspec-

tim and srperuision firnctims drring 1992. In the
face of such inadequacies,

and dispntes and shifting
responsibility. To read of
Money Muket Association
of Nigeria denying Central
Bank of Nigeria's allegation of usurping its powers
and vice versa reflects lack
of control going hay-wire.
For example, both the op
erators and the regulators
lnorv the crushing effect
of the rising interest rate
on the economy generated
by untrealthy competition
for firnds. Apart from "tpfront interest payments"
denying the govemment of
tax tpvenue and increasing
the cost of borrowing, the
removal of zuch upfront in-

terest payments should
therefore be part of apack-

age

of

understanding

among operators for moni34

mire.

(ii)h

the case of the mortgage
instinrtions, f was intrigued
if not arnused by the blunt
and brutally frank castiga-

tion of mortgage institutions by Mr. John Akinloye
and Dr. Salihu Karshi, Director of the FMBN and

Chairman of Housing
Policy Council respectively, about the obviou,s
arnbivalence in operational
mismatch of their shortterm borrowiog ir form of

deposits and long-term
lending for housing on the
faulty expectation of "sharing" the National Housing
Furd" On two occasions
during the course of this
year when I was asked to
present papers on the future ofmortgage operations

I

drew their

attention to three important iszues which today
are big challenges to all of
them:

Either fbr want of action or
zuffiocation of duties from official quarters, a novel idea of

tbe vohrntary coming to compromise arrangement is begether of financial opera- ing developed between corpotors in fomi4g associations rate croditors andcorporate debtto bring order, sanity, pro- ors to solve their problems outfess ionalism and ethics into side the orthodory. Unforhrthe system should be en- nately, this has been received
coruaged instead of what with a great deal of hassle.
looks like open confronta- Rather than for the regulatory
tion which hightens loss of authorities to openly castigate
confidence in the systern such scheme as function-usurThe sa&ress attendant on pation, the working of mind and
the financial system is to cooperation will be a way forsee both the regulated and ward out of the financial quagthe regulator hadi4g words

in Nigeria,

ttri4g by the regulators.

(a)

their expectation on the
National Housing Fund,
where commercial and
merchant banks and insurance companies will be
compelled to lend to them

at 4o/o the money which
they are now competing
for with the same institutions from the depositors ;

and/or which many of
them place with the same
banl6 or finance houses
at market rate. Does it
make sense? They disagreed.

(b)their operations so far are
not for any mortgage lending; instead, they engage
in LPO financing, other
short-term banking and

finance companies' op
erations without re gard for
any financial or prudential ratios. Th"y deny.
(c) giving the present level of
interest rates, it will be
interesting to know how
many mortgages trey have

financed, who are their
crstomers and how they
are coping with repayment. They say everything
is fine.

above M5 to the US dollar.
How do we service ourexternal
debt of $35 billion at such terribly depreciated rate of exctrange? The Federal Govemment embarked on weird spendiog thrt has nothing concrete
and productive to show for it
and committed the country to
external debt it can not service.
Review of the Finenciel
In effect, don't blaure naim exSystem
ctrange rate depreciation; don't
Finally, the recent announce- blame ri.irrg interest rate; don't
ment by the Federal Military blame negative reseryes posiGovemmentto settp an inter- tion; don't blame sustained balministerial- cum- departnental ance of payments deficit; don't
body to shrdy the Naira ex- blame other adverse
change rate is to me again adhoc Inacro€conomic developments.
and half-measure, merely tack- Blame the underlying causes
Iing me aspect ofourfmancial for what they are worth, which
system as a tool of monetary is the financial indiscipline at
policy and leaving the rest all levels of govemment, and
provide a cure. That is why I
blowing in the wind
Any &astic irnprovement in share the view of ltdr. Philip
our economic performance Ikhile, who realised that full
which will lead to productive blorvn explosion in the growth
and efficient revitalisatim of of our financial system can not
ourwhole financial system is a but be accompanied by some
firnction of financial discipline realities of adverse and uninby all arms ofgovemment. For tended developments and conexample, while it is tnre that sequences; yet fail to aclsrowldevahration breeds inflation, edge the problems when indeed
reduces the standard of living they are real. The realities must
and kills industries, who is los- be faced as fundamental and
i4g if the naira is artificially dismal; and solutions to them
held doum at N22 to the US mustbe fourd and facedprofesdollar officially, when nearly sionally andrealistically - bearall industries, if only to sur- ing short-term pains in order to
vive, are btrying "under the be ableto enjoy long-tenngains.
For the rapid changes that have
counler" or "behind the s cene"
at N35 to the US dollar, not to takenplace in ourfinancial systalk of the brreaur de ctrange tem inthe last ffieen years and
and the parallel market rates of the accompanying problems
Nour that the new bosses at
the helm of affairs at the regulatory apex of the housing frnance sector see the need for
the overhaul of the regulatory
arsenal of that seotm, mayh
sorrc sanity will be made to
bear on the sector.
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which are now proving intrac-

table and insoluble, a fullblown Review of Nigeria's Financial System is now over-

due, after the review of the
system that was undertaken by
Dr. Pir:s Okigbo in 1977 .
That have not stated the
terms of reference will be a
surprise. It is deliberate. The

I

problerns we have identified
are thernselves sufficient terms
of reference. What I need to
add is the cornpromised position of the Central Bank of
Nigeria as an independent
monetary authority for the suc -

cessful implementation of
macroeconomic policies.
Some of us who fought or
worked hard to see the Central
Bank free from the dictates of
the Federal Ministy ofFinance
wanted the Bank to be independent not of the Government, but to exercise its stanr-

tory functions, unfettered
within the Govemrnent. When
the good news came that the
Central Bank was no more
under the punriew of the Federal Ministry of Finance, we
did not think of exchangrng for
it the Presidency fromwhere it
receives marching orders that
it can not resist. The consequenco has been a shattering
blow for the image ofthe Bank
as

revealed by the World Bank's

Confidential Report on Nigeria forthe period 1985 to 1991.
The relevant part as it affects
the Central Bank is quoted

below:
However, Bank staff atteryts to account for the
proceeds from oil production in 1990 produced a
shortfall of foreign exchange inflows reflected in
the official Central Bank
cashflow of around $2.1
billion, ofwhich only $0.6
billion can be explained by
the two continuing dedication accoturts.
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In additioq the Report goes
on

there is evidence to
suggest that some N5.6

billion counterpart of
around $0.5 billion of
foreign exchange oil
receipts reported by the

Central Bank did not
pass to the Federation

Account Committee for
distribution.

In this kind of situation, it
will b€ hard put fa the rcgulated to respect the regulator.
And that is the big challenge
forrefomring the entire financial systern-
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Year

Current
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Current
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Pnrf'essor S. Tomori's Lecture on the 2nd Adekanye Annual Leacture Table

I 28th October 1993
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,051.0

@

II

TABLE

MONEY SUPPLY COMPONENTS

MI

DEMAND

Ml.DD

Million

Deposit (DD)

Million

RATIO OF
DD to

M2
Million

CURRENCY
Retio

Ml

1,984
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4,884
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40
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Currently ratio or money multiplier

Central Bank of Nigeria. StatiscalBulletin Vol. 2. No. 2

l99l and Annual

Report, 1992
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TABLE III
TIIONETISATION RATIO.
Year
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r4.906

29.995

20.7

0.05

44.6

0.08

r

988

77.000

21,149

42.'180

27.5

15.6

55.6

30.7

r989

8t

,000

25,698

46,223

3r.6

I

t.6

56.8

20.9

r990

88.s00

37.234

64.903

42.t

r4.4

73.3

25.t

t99t

92,900

49,365

86,153

53.

t6.l

92.7

28.0

t992

96,800

82,165

t

35,280

84.5

7.8

137.8

29.2

June '93

N.A.

82,634

t50,496

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

r

r

Source:

Ratio of money supply to Gross National Product. Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Reports. Various Years.

Note

GNP Deflator

:

Real M

I or M2 at 1985 prices, i.e.

MI
P=n

or

M2

P:n

5
o

TABLE IV
FINANC IALISATION RATIO.

Year

Ratio of Bank

I\ferchant and
Commercial Bank
Assels (N million)

GNP

(N) I\{illion

Assets to GNP

r

984

63,006

34,563

54.9

r

985

68,916

36.999

53.1

I

986

7t

,076

48,t24

67.8

I

987

72.000

62, I 08

86.3

I

988

77.OW

76,430

99.9

I

989

8r

.400

87.64t

r08.0

I

990

88,500

lll,55r

126.0

92,900

155,457

t67.0

96.800

232,279

240.0

NA

NA

NA

t99

t

t992
June'93

a

Ratio of merchant and commercial bank assets to Gross National Product

Sourcc:

Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report. Various issues.

